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Abstract

This paper looks at the renminbi as a trade settlement currency in the countries that make
up the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. The paper first looks at the trade picture in
ASEAN, and how the old trade dynamics with the United States were broken down during the
1997 Asian financial crisis. In the ensuing power vacuum, China started to replace the United
States as a trade partner, growing today to become even larger of a trade partner than the U.S
ever was. The following section explores the role of the growth of the renminbi in use as a trade
settlement currency in ASEAN, using the U.S. dollar as a foil.
By looking at Chinese policy in liberalizing the renminbi, this paper also draws
conclusions about whether or not there’s room for the renminbi to grow in ASEAN in use as a
trade settlement currency. In concluding, this paper will look at the broader picture and whether
or not the Chinese renminbi has the potential to become a currency as widely used and held as
major currencies like the Japanese yen, British pound sterling, or Euro.
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Executive Summary
In a relatively small amount of time, China has become one of the world’s most
prominent superpowers. The country boasts a population of 1.3 billion people and currently runs
the second largest economy in the world, according to the World Bank.
China is a big player in the international economy, but the question remains about
whether or not China is capable of sustaining its remarkable growth. One way of measuring
China’s growth as a world superpower is by looking at its currency: the Chinese renminbi. If the
renminbi can join the likes of the Japanese yen, British pound sterling and Euro as an
international currency, there’s a strong economic case for continued Chinese growth in the world
economy.
The story of the renminbi in Southeast Asia as a trade settlement currency paints a clear
picture about where the renminbi and China are headed. The steady rise in China’s importance in
the ASEAN economies not only dethroned the United States’ historically strong ties in the
region, but continues to grow year after year.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has ten member countries (Brunei,
Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and
Indonesia) and is geographically close with China. As such, the region is deeply rooted in
historical and economic relationships with China, providing valuable insight into the true
strength of China’s economic power.
But it wasn’t always that way. Prior to the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Southeast Asian
countries had strong economic ties with the United States, who had a strong presence in the
region because of the Vietnam War. During that time, Southeast Asian countries were also
embroiled in a heated battle with China over territorial lines, strengthening a reliance on the U.S.
When Thailand’s economic collapse caused a domino effect throughout Southeast Asia,
China came to the rescue. The 1997 Asian financial crisis was a tipping point that saw the United
States retract from the region as China filled in the vacuum. Today, ASEAN acknowledges the
need to coordinate policy with its East Asian neighbors to avoid another financial collapse,
which means closer ties with China.
ASEAN is also a valuable partner for China. The region has shown promising GDP
growth that could reach $4.7 trillion by 2020, and has already passed India in GDP. Indonesia,
Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand all have improved financial structures with the potential of
earning “advanced market” status if they can get past political instability and weak monetary
policy. Even poorer countries in ASEAN have shown promising signs of economic development,
with GDP growth in Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar averaging about 8%.
In the case of ASEAN and China, an important trade relationship exists. The trade picture
in ASEAN shows China skyrocketing to the top of almost every country’s trade partners in the
last ten years. Additionally, trade between ASEAN and China has been steadily growing on a
year-to-year basis, increasing the value of China’s economic ties with the region.
For most of the Southeast Asian countries, trade has historically been invoiced in U.S.
dollars. U.S. dollars have always been the common standard for international trade because it’s
considered a stable currency. But the liberalization of China’s renminbi and a desire to decrease
financial ties to U.S. economic risks have increased the use of the renminbi in ASEAN. In 2012,
ASEAN settled the highest percentage of its trade in renminbi in comparison to any other region
in the world.
The growth of China and ASEAN’s relationship is reflected by trade statistics showing
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an increase in renminbi invoicing for trade. Assuming China continues its healthy trade
relationship with ASEAN, there’s still a long way to go before the dollar is uprooted as an
invoicing currency. But the impressively fast liberalization of the renminbi might increase
international pressure to use the renminbi in trade settlement, which could possibly boost the
renminbi’s share of use. This is especially the case when considering China’s growing
relationships with African and South American countries.
The renminbi in ASEAN is a preview into the strength that China could leverage in other
parts of the world. Holding all else equal, a more widely invoiced renminbi would signal a more
prominent China in the global economy for continued years.
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1. Introduction
The Chinese renminbi, which translates to “people’s currency,” has grown to become a
major player in the global economy. But it was not always that way.
In the interest of controlling the power of its currency, the Chinese government had
levied strong rules and limits on buying and selling foreign currencies until 1997, when some
convertibility was allowed. Since then, the government has slowly liberalized its currency in the
global market.
In 2001, China joined the World Trade Organization and began loosening control over its
currency. In 2009, China launched a trial program in select cities allowing companies to settle
foreign trade in renminbi. The next year, China loosened the peg and instituted a managed float
against a basket of currencies, effectively ending its peg to the U.S. dollar. By 2011, the
renminbi had a 0.24% share in world payments, making it the 21st most used currency for trade
transactions. 1 By February 2015, the renminbi had moved up to seventh place, with a share of
1.81%. 2
The rise of the renminbi raises questions about just how international the currency can
get. In a survey from State Street and the Economist Intelligence Unit, 53% of a pool of 200
institutional investors said they think the renminbi will one day surpass the U.S. dollar as the
world’s major reserve currency. 3
China itself is showing signs that it wants its currency to become more prominent in the
global picture. China has requested that the International Monetary Fund add the renminbi to its

1
SWIFT (2011). RMB Internationalisation: Implications for the global financial industry. http://goo.gl/1savsp
(Accessed 18 March 2015).
2
SWIFT. (2015). SWIFT RMB Monthly Tracker March 2015. http://goo.gl/ICCpgK (Accessed 5 April 2015).
3
The Economist. (2013). Renminbi rising: Onshore and offshore perspectives on Chinese financial liberalization.
http://goo.gl/ju5JZ2 (Accessed 5 April 2015).
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basket of key currencies used to supplement IMF member countries’ official reserves (Chen,
2015).
Still, China remains a developing country and the renminbi is far from earning global
currency status in a U.S. dollar-dominated world. So in context of China’s growth, is the
renminbi is on its way to becoming a currency as widely used as the Japanese Yen, British Pound
Sterling, or Euro?
This paper will answer this question by focusing on the use of the renminbi in trade
settlements between China and the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations 4.
The paper will begin with a historical analysis of the United States in ASEAN and how
political and military involvement in Southeast Asia led to soft power and economic ties to the
region from the Vietnam War to 1997. In section 3, the paper will look at the rise of China as an
economic power and how it was financially prepared to be a savior and friend to ASEAN during
the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Section 4 will use the historical context behind American
presence in Southeast Asia as explained in section 2 to explain the prominence of the U.S. dollar
in the region. Section 5 is paralleled with section 4 and uses the historical context behind China’s
economic growth to explain the increasing role of the renminbi in the region. The paper will then
wrap up with a look into what the Chinese government is doing to further liberalize the currency
and what can be expected from the renminbi in the future.

4

To be referred to in the rest of this paper as “ASEAN”
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1.1 Money
Money has three basic characteristics: unit of account, store of value, and medium of
exchange. These three basic functions translate into international uses for governments and
private agents, as noted by Kenen (1983) in a taxonomy first noted by Cohen (1971) as
illustrated in table 1.
Money serves in various roles, but this paper will focus specifically on money as a
medium of exchange. In this function, a currency serves as a mutually accepted form of payment
that can carry out foreign trade transactions. In the context of the renminbi, we will look at how
the currency is being used in Chinese trade with the ASEAN countries.

1.2 Why Trade?
While there are many ways to measure the renminbi’s growth as an international
currency, we look at the currency in trade because it’s generally the first step in earning global
status. As Eichengreen (2012) notes in Exorbitant Privilege, international transactions are key to
making a currency dominant in foreign exchange markets.
If, for example, Southeast Asian countries are trending towards using the renminbi more
and more to settle their exports to China, there’s substantial reason to believe that China does
have some level of economic leverage and trust in their trade dynamics with those countries.
Eichengreen (2012) notes that there’s also a snowball effect in foreign use of a currency
spurned by use in trade. “Since it [currency] pays for exporters of financial services, like
exporters of merchandise, to avoid confusing their customers, they, too, will price their products
in the same currency as their competitors.”

3

Considering the importance of trade, this paper will look at changing trends in the
renminbi’s use as a currency in trade to draw conclusions about the renminbi’s potential to
become as widely used as the euro, yen, pound sterling, or even the U.S. dollar.
This paper will use statistics from ASEAN, China, and third-party databases to examine
these changes. It is important to note that there are reporting discrepancies between data from
ASEAN and China, and those differences will be explained and noted where necessary.
Additionally, for the purposes of this paper it is important to note that ASEAN will refer
to the ten member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, which are Brunei
Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore,
Thailand, and Vietnam.
There are sometimes mentions of ASEAN Plus Three, which add China, Japan, and
South Korea to the mix for the purposes of regional economic integration. For this paper we will
exclude mentions of ASEAN Plus Three.
The two ASEAN observer nations of East Timor and Papua New Guinea will also not be
mentioned.

1.3 Why ASEAN?
The relationship between ASEAN and China is complicated and laced with decades of
political, economic, and at times, military conflict. But today, China’s rise as a global
superpower means that ASEAN has economic reasons to tighten its ties with its very close
neighbor. Conversely, China has it’s own economic incentives to strengthen a trade relationship
with ASEAN. This relationship has serious implications to the growing internationalization of
the renminbi and its use as a trade settlement currency.

4

As a geographical region, ASEAN holds advantageous opportunities for China in terms
of natural resources, agriculture, and various industries. China also sees consumer opportunities
in ASEAN, and has increased investment in those countries.
These opportunities come from ASEAN’s own growth. According to Morgan Stanley
Capital International’s most recent annual market classification, five of the ASEAN countries are
classified as “emerging markets” or “frontier markets.” 5
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand are all “emerging markets,” having
improved their financial structures with stronger banks, equity markets, and currencies. These
countries pose significant investment risks like political instability and irresponsible monetary
policy, but can become decidedly “advanced markets” if they continue to develop their
economies. S&P Dow Jones’s Global Broad Market Index 6 also identifies these four countries as
emerging markets as well, but based mostly on the performance of their stock markets. 7
As a “frontier market,” Vietnam has exhibited promising growth in market capitalization
and liquidity. With stable regulation and apt monetary policy, frontier markets like Vietnam can
progress and become an emerging market.
Even poorer countries of ASEAN have shown promising signs of economic development.
Although Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar are not included in the lists of S&P or MSCI, the three
countries have had annual average GDP growth of almost 8% since the turn of the century. For
this reason, Deutsche Bank has classified the three countries as “frontier markets” exhibiting
promising growth and potential as players in world trade. 8

5
Morgan Stanley Capital International, Inc. (2013). ‘2013 Annual Market Classification Review.’
https://www.msci.com/eqb/pressreleases/archive/2013_Mkt_Class_PR.pdf (Accessed 23 December 2013).
6
Shortened to “S&P BMI”
7
S&P Dow Jones Indices. (2013). ‘S&P Global BMI – Equity Indices.’ http://goo.gl/Z7L65g (Accessed 23
December 2013).
8
Deutsche Bank. (2012). ‘New Asian frontier markets.’ http://goo.gl/04ps5I (Accessed 23 Dec. 2013).
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The emerging and frontier markets of ASEAN tell a story of a region with promising
opportunities in terms of both exports and imports. A lot of these opportunities come from
investors shifting their focus from China to Southeast Asia. More expensive labor and capital
costs for manufacturing in China are encouraging cost-cutting entrepreneurs to move their
industries to countries like Indonesia and Vietnam (Chu, 2013). China welcomes the migration in
manufacturing. As the country continues to push growth towards a service-oriented and
technological economy, the nation’s leaders are welcoming gradual reduction in the
manufacturing industry. Southeast Asia’s improving efficiency, abundant labor, and close
proximity to China are attracting new investors.
Amongst each other, ASEAN is improving as well. Cross-border investment in
increasing as the nations engage each other in economic and political dialogue that has
encouraged openness with fellow Southeast Asian countries. Although integration is not at
European Union levels, ASEAN is on the whole showing promising GDP growth that could
reach $4.7 trillion by 2020. ASEAN has already surpassed India in GDP, and this is with about
half of India’s population (Khanna, 2013).
As a whole, ASEAN is getting wealthier and narrowing the development gap as foreign
investors see greater opportunity in the region. With projected growth of around 5.5% from
2013-2017, short-term growth is promising a stable and sustainable future for the region. 9 In
terms of total trade, ASEAN grew by 16.8% in 2010-2011, with some of the higher percentage
growth coming from the frontier markets of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Myanmar. 10

9

Organisation for the Economic Co-operation and Development. (2013). ‘Southeast Asian Economic Outlook
2013.’ OECD Development Centre. http://goo.gl/sx59z6 (Accessed 23 December 2013).
10
Association of Southeast Asian Nations. (2013). ‘ASEAN Trade, 2010-2011.’ http://goo.gl/lHnH3j (Accessed
23 December 2013).
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Continuing growth in ASEAN looks promising but the region’s governments must stay
committed to stability and apt monetary policy. Maintaining these elements is key to attracting
private consumption and investment, which is hugely responsible for economic growth in these
emerging and frontier markets.
ASEAN’s rise as a new frontier of global trade will be hugely influential in the future of
currency exchange as consequently to the trajectory of the renminbi. China is well aware of this.
Since the 1997 Asian financial crisis, China has taken several measures to loosen barriers
of trade with ASEAN and build a strong rapport with their neighbors. Bilateral trade between the
countries not only brings regional support in the Asian economies, but also advances China’s
long-term economic interests. The historically complicated histories of ASEAN and China
presented challenges in achieving strong bilateral relationships, but by turn of the millennium the
foundation had been put in place to help China become ASEAN’s favored trade partner.

2. The Trade Picture: ASEAN and the U.S.
While China has made great strides in their relationship with ASEAN, the United States
has actually held a historical advantage in the region. The United States benefited from a
historically rooted influence in the region, as many of the ASEAN countries developed political
and economic dependencies on America beginning with the Vietnam War.
China, on the other hand, had to overcome historically complicated relations with
ASEAN. But China’s economic growth made it an important ally to the ASEAN countries
during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, which began a new chapter of economic integration that
was helped along by geographical proximity.

7

Understanding the history behind the United States’ trade relationship with ASEAN will
contextualize the importance of China’s rise in the region after the crisis and the consequential
increase in the use of the renminbi in the region.

2.1 Statistics
There are many sources for trade statistics between ASEAN and China. ASEAN has its
own database, called ASEANstats while China reports its trade statistics in its annual China
Statistical Yearbook. The United Nations also has its UN Comtrade Database. To avoid reporting
biases from either ASEAN or China, I have decided to use the UN Comtrade Database. These
biases are reflected in Table 2, which shows that in comparison to the UN Comtrade’s numbers,
trade volume was under-reported by an average of 2.8% between 2000 and 2013. China was
shown to have over-reported trade by an average of 18.8% during that same period.
Some of the discrepancies in reporting come from accounting ambiguity as to whether or
not the Hong Kong special administrative region is included in the calculation for China’s trade
statistics. Including Hong Kong would substantially increase the share of total exports, since
Hong Kong generally records a trade deficit. For this paper, statistics regarding Hong Kong and
the smaller trade region of Macao were excluded to keep the subject of the analysis on mainland
China’s trade dynamics in ASEAN.
The trade statistics pulled for the wide variety of tables and figures in this section also do
not consider re-import and re-export numbers from the UN Comtrade Database. Only raw export
and import data was pulled for the purposes of analysis.
Additionally, there are some holes in data because of a lack of reporting from some
ASEAN countries at certain times. Trade statistics from Lao PDR are not reported and are
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therefore not reflected in the following data. Myanmar has only reported once a year, while
Brunei has a sporadic pattern of reporting. Vietnam and Cambodia only had trade statistics
available after 2000.

2.2 The United States in ASEAN
After World War II, the United States had embarked on aggressive anti-communist
international relations policy. In Southeast Asia, the United States lobbied for the creation of a
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 11, in which the countries would pledge anti-communist
politics. But the United States’ efforts only managed to court Philippines and Thailand. Some
countries adopted Indonesia’s anti-Western policy while others followed Burma’s generally
ambivalent foreign policy towards the U.S. and other world powers (Areethamsirikul, 2008).
American foreign policy then shifted towards money, and the U.S. began providing
economic assistance in an effort to prevent the spread of communism in lieu of Mao Zedong’s
rise in China. By bringing capital to Southeast Asia, wealth and standard of living would
increase, bringing political stability to the region. At that time in 1967, U.S. trade with Southeast
Asia made up only 7% of total U.S. exports and 8% of total U.S. imports (Areethamsirikul,
2008). It was also in 1967 that ASEAN was founded.
ASEAN quickly became one of the fastest-growing regions in the world, with the United
States as a growing trade partner. The gross domestic product 12 of the member countries grew at
an average annual rate of 6.6% between the 1970s and 1995 (Setboonsarng, 1998).
In a 2000 speech by then Prime Minister of Singapore Goh Chok Tong, the United States
was referred to as an important pillar of support during the turbulent days of the Vietnam War:

11
12

Or “SEATO”
Or “GDP”
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The US involvement in Vietnam bought precious time for the ASEAN countries to put
their house in order and to lay the foundation for the grouping to develop into a cohesive
organisation. ASEAN economies began to take off, spurred by US investments and a
friendly American market. 13
The 1980s saw a period of rapid industrial growth in ASEAN, with particular development in
manufactured products industries. By 1987, 36% of ASEAN’s exports to the United States were
in manufactures (Naya, Sandhu, Plummer, and Akrasanee, 1989).
The United States’ post-Vietnam War economic relationship with ASEAN realigned the
region’s key trade partners. Since the 1960s, Japan had been ASEAN’s largest trade partner. In
the mid 1970s, the United States started to chip away at Japan’s share of trade. By 1986, the
United States had surpassed Japan as ASEAN’s largest export market (Naya, Sandhu, Plummer,
and Akrasanee, 1989).
Economic success had also proven itself to be a strong political tool to stabilize the
countries during the later parts of the Cold War. Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand
saw some level of government reform and liberalization following the increase in U.S. trade (Tan
and Akrasanee, 1990). Singapore, which was widely considered a poor, politically unstable citystate in the mid-1960s, grew to become one of the world’s most developed countries (Kreinin
and Plummer, 2002).

2.3 The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis: Falling Faith in the U.S.
In the 1990s, ASEAN showed no signs of slowing down. ASEAN had actually proved
itself to be a relatively robust economic region, weathering both the collapse of the Bretton

13

Speech by Goh Chok Tong in New York on 7 September 2000. ASEAN-US Relations: Challenges. Full speech
from Asia Society at: http://goo.gl/wM09xl (Accessed 7 April 2015).
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Woods system and the early 1980s global recession without any substantial setbacks
(Setboonsarng, 1998).
In 1990, ASEAN’s resilience was tested again, as restrictive American monetary policy
and the residuals of the 1987 stock market crash slowed down the global economy. But the
ASEAN countries had posted impressive GDP growth rates from 1990 to 1991, growing as a
region by 6.22% in 1991. The ASEAN countries didn’t even lose momentum; GDP growth rates
actually increased from 1993-1995 (Table 3).
During this period, the aggressive export-led economies of Southeast Asia continued to
churn out manufactured goods. The importance of agriculture in ASEAN decreased while
services increased, showing signs that the region might soon earn developed nation statuses
(Kreinin and Plummer, 2002).
But to live by the sword is to die by the sword. Stronger economies meant stronger
ASEAN currencies, which made their exports more expensive and consequently hurt export
volumes in 1996. Total trade more or less flattened between 1996 and 1997, although Thailand
and Indonesia actually experienced a decline in trade (Figure 1).
As a result, ugly trade deficits had piled up. With the exception of Singapore, which was
running an advanced economy as a trade hub of Southeast Asia, the key ASEAN countries of
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand were battling swelling trade deficits during the
1990s (Setboonsarng, 1998). In 1991, Malaysia was trying to control deficits of 8.8% of GDP,
and successfully did so until it exploded again to 10% of GDP in 1995. Thailand had a deficit of
8.1% of GDP in 1995 (Table 4).
Slowing trade was the first domino to fall in the 1997 economic crisis that brought
several Asian economies to their knees in what is now called the Asian financial crisis. In about
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one year, the Asian financial ecosystem had spiraled down and reversed years of economic
progress in developed countries with previously well-regarded financial strength. Indonesia and
Thailand’s economies shrunk by 13% and 10.5% respectively. Malaysia’s economy, which
comparatively didn’t suffer as bad, still contracted 7% (Ramesh 2009).
But how did this happen? Until the crisis, most financial shocks happened in countries
with weak trade and poorly managed monetary policy. By 1997, the Asian countries had
developed strong export relationships and proven good financial management to substantiate
their role in the global economy.
In hindsight the crisis showed that strong trade and GDP growth isn’t always a good
indicator of an economy’s structural integrity. Thailand, one of the shining stars of ASEAN’s
economic growth, had actually gotten carried away with its wealth. Banks began making
irresponsible investments in real estate abroad and loosely handing out large loans. With an
appreciating Thai baht and slowing exports, Thailand found it hard to manage its debts and faced
the scrutiny of foreign investors who started to grow wary of Thailand and ASEAN’s economies
(Lai, 2000).
As a result Thailand became the epicenter of the crisis, as speculators, knowing that Thai
traders settled all of their transactions in the US dollar, began losing faith that the Thai baht
could maintain its peg to the dollar. When investors sold their Thai baht for US dollars, the
government’s depleted reserves of greenbacks strong-armed the government into dropping the
peg and the slip began (Lall, 1997). Figure 1 shows dramatic drops in 1997 in trade across all of
the reporting ASEAN countries.
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Fearing that a collapse of Southeast Asia would have crippling global consequences, the
International Monetary Fund 14 and the World Bank started pumping austerity into the region.
The IMF also followed the same model they employed in Latin America in the 1980s by
enforcing revised fiscal and monetary policies to cut spending and control inflation. But as
Joseph Stiglitz (2000), the chief economist and vice president of the World Bank between 1997
and 2000 said, the IMF’s policies actually worsened the crisis:
I thought this was a mistake. For one thing, unlike the Latin American nations, the East
Asian countries were already running budget surpluses. In Thailand, the government was
running such large surpluses that it was actually starving the economy of much needed
investments in education and infrastructure, both essential to economic growth…The
problem was not imprudent government, as in Latin America; the problem was an
imprudent private sector—all those bankers and borrowers, for instance, who’d gambled
on the real estate bubble.
The actions of the IMF and the World Bank lost the faith of Southeast Asia, with some believing
that the austerity was designed to save foreign investors instead of the countries themselves.
Additionally, the United States lost favor in the eyes of Southeast Asians, as most of the
speculator pullback in US dollars had come from the west.
Tong said it himself in his 2000 speech. “The US has lost some goodwill in the region
since the Asian financial crisis. Fairly or unfairly, the US was perceived to be not forthcoming
enough in helping the Southeast Asian countries” (2000).
With falling sentiment against the US, the IMF, and the World Bank, the ASEAN
countries came to realize that regional economic cooperation was necessary to prevent another

14

or “IMF”

13

domino-effect economic collapse. That meant working with its East Asian neighbors to
coordinate policy and create a liquidity support system (Lee and Park, 2014).
This had paved the way for China to become a new key trade partner for ASEAN.

3. The Trade Picture: ASEAN and China
With the United States losing credibility in ASEAN, a power vacuum started to form.
China’s economic reform between the 1980s and early 1990s primed the country to be the
perfect replacement for the United States when the crisis struck Southeast Asia.
The desire to create regional economic relationships to weather global economic risks
gave China the opportunities to build long lasting relationships with ASEAN. Political and
economic talks eventually broke down barriers to trade between ASEAN and China, and trade
consequently bloomed.
The product of increased trade was a more utilized renminbi, as ASEAN and China
began seeing benefits in settling trade in a regionally-based currency as opposed to the U.S.
dollar.

3.1 Pre-Crisis China-ASEAN Relations
Had it been any earlier in history, China may not have had the resources or political
strength to assist a struggling ASEAN in the 1997 Asian financial crisis. History shows that
China and Southeast Asia had a complicated relationship prior to 1997, with Cold War politics
and a reforming China at the root of uncertainty.

14

Until his death in 1976, China was at the hands of Mao Zedong, a principled leader who
sought to install a modified brand of communism that involved a heavily planned economy. Mao
Zedong’s goal was to industrialize China through domestic economic sustenance.
The Maoist government took control of several industries during a period of time called
the “Great Leap Forward.” Having bureaucratic control of these industries, China was able to
manipulate prices to create profits for state-owned enterprises and consequently the state
(Lieberthal, 2004).
These companies were then transformed into communities where work became
synonymous with lifestyle and nationalism became synonymous with all functions of life
(Sullivan, 2007). At Anshan Iron and Steel Company, living quarters and schooling for children
were provided along employee pay. Employees were told their purpose was to strengthen the
party and further the progress of the proletariats.
The same general concept was applied to rural farming, where communes were
constructed. Communes were communities where families lived, slept and worked. Crop yields
were heavily regulated and accounted so that both the commune families and the country’s
industrial complexes like Anshan were well supplied.
Mao Zedong’s brand of socialist planning fell to the natural mechanics of economics, and
the unmotivated and unevenly distributed laborers of the country failed to produce to Mao’s
calculations. When drought struck the country, a terrible period of famine ensued in China that
left millions dead (Huntington, 1983).
By the time Mao Zedong died in 1976, the Chinese people knew they wanted reform.
Their new president, Deng Xiaoping, realized that a stronger China had to begin with a stronger
economy. After taking power in 1978, he began working towards the installation of a “market

15

economy with Chinese characteristics.” Part of that plan involved reforming and opening China
to trade through pragmatic economic policy.
Xiaoping zoned in on Southeast Asia, Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan as economic
partners. Combined, they made up over 70% of China’s external trade and investment in the
twenty years following Xiaoping’s rise to power (Viraphol, 2006). But beyond geographic
proximity, Xiaoping cleverly took advantage of the high numbers of entrepreneurs of Chinese
origin that lived in those countries. Ethnic Chinese business owners in Southeast Asian cities like
Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore became great links for China to create cultural links and
facilitate trade (Stuart-Fox, 2003).
These economic initiatives also lined up with political efforts to normalize relations with
Southeast Asia, although Chinese foreign policy more or less enabled the United States to pursue
its post-Vietnam military, economic, and political involvement in the region. When Deng
Xiaoping visited Southeast Asia, he emphasized the need for stability in lieu of a U.S.
withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973. China was incredibly concerned with the growing presence of
the Soviet Union because of the power vacuum that was growing as the U.S. gradually pulled
military from the region. When America started using soft power to economically prop up the
region, China stepped aside and allowed the U.S. to develop trade relationships with the region
through the 70s and much of the 80s. (Sutter, 2005).
But China’s cry for political stability was undermined by their support of the Khmer
Rouge, who sought to create a Maoist agrarian utopia and left about 1.7 million people dead in
the experiment (Bezlova, 2009). When Soviet-backed Vietnamese troops overthrew Pol Pot and
the Khmer Rouge regime, China threw military support behind the Cambodians and launched a
failed campaign into Vietnam in 1979 (Sutter, 2005).
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China’s flirtations with communist guerrillas in Thailand and conflict with ASEAN states
over ownership of islands in the South China Sea also hindered China’s ability to better trade
relationships with Southeast Asia (McCartan, 2009).
Despite all of this, China’s domestic economic reform helped spur its economy as the
1980s rolled in. Industrialization had brought more jobs and a bigger population to be employed
for those jobs. An increase in wealth also increased per capita private consumption, raising the
overall price level (Ash and Kueh, 1996).
As a result, GDP growth soared as high as 15.2% in 1984. Figure 2 shows GDP mapped
against trade patterns. In the 1980s, GDP averaged an impressive 9.75%, led by strong
manufacturing output and an inflow of foreign direct investment after Xiaoping’s economic
opening (Table 5). Figure 2 does show a sharp decline in 1988 and 1989. That decline can be
attributed to a rush of outflow of foreign direct investment amid concerns over the Tiananmen
Square protests and high levels of inflation.
But by the 1990s, China had established itself globally as a huge trade partner. Average
growth during the 1990s was at 9.99%, as total trade cracked $300 billion. When the 1997 Asian
financial crisis struck, China had positioned itself as one of the most up and coming economies
in the world.

3.2 A Helping Hand: ASEAN and China Post-Crisis
The 1997 Asian financial crisis had signaled the beginning of a shift in ASEAN trade
dynamics in which China began replacing the United States as a major trade partner.
It helped that China had not been hurt by the 1997 Asian financial crisis. While Indonesia
and Thailand’s economies were contracting by double digits, in 1997 and 1998, China was

17

growing its GDP by 9.3% and 7.8%, respectively. Between 1997 and 1998, Chinese total trade
contracted by a negligible $1 billion (Figure 2).
As a result, China was able to provide ASEAN with over $4 billion in aid. Some of that
money had been passed through the IMF while other sums were provided bilaterally (McCartan,
2009). China gave financial assistance packages to the arguably most battered countries:
Indonesia and Thailand. These packages included standby loans through the IMF (Morrison,
1999).
But perhaps the most supportive action from China was the government’s decision to
hold their fixed rate currency as ASEAN countries depreciated their currencies. In doing so,
ASEAN exports became more competitive in the global market and restarted the regional
economy (McCartan, 2009).
China’s dovish attitude towards the Asian financial crisis helped to break down U.S.
economic ties to the region. In a report to Congress, economic specialist Wayne Morrison (1999)
warned that China’s response to the crisis would displace the United States as a key trade
partner:
However, many analysts have expressed concern that a deepening of the global financial
crisis may induce China to devalue its currency, the yuan, in order to stimulate export
throughout East Asia, which would further depress U.S. exports to the region.
China did exactly that. With more competitively priced goods, ASEAN was able to boost exports
to China and the rest of the world. But China also benefited; since the country imports a lot of its
raw materials and machinery from ASEAN, cheaper goods lowered costs for many Chinese
manufacturing companies.
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In December of 1997, Chinese President Jiang Zemin delivered a speech in Kuala
Lumpur in which he noted the need to develop a bilateral relationship with ASEAN
economically and politically. Zemin outlined his desire for a “good neighbor partnership,” using
cultural similarities and geographic proximity as a foundation for common ground:
At the moment, China and ASEAN countries are seizing the historic opportunity to
formulate development strategies in accordance with their own countries’ economic and
social conditions to drive an increase in productivity and continue economic growth. 15
Regional economic cooperation began with the creation of a currency safety net. In 2000,
ASEAN, China, Japan and South Korea signed the Chiang Mai Initiative, which was a
multilateral pact aimed at creating financial integration in the region. Under the agreement, the
ASEAN member countries agreed to expand swap facilities so that countries facing liquidity
problems could swap domestic currency for U.S. dollars from another country’s reserves with a
promise to pay back at a later date (Sussangkarn, 2010).
Initiatives to ramp up trade followed soon after in 2001, when China was accessed into
the World Trade Organization 16. This was a huge move for China, not because they had been
petitioning to join the organization since 1986, but because the country was eager to become a
defined market economy and fully join the world economy as a competitive trading partner
(Bader, 2002). From Southeast Asia’s perspective, China’s WTO membership held more clout as
a trading partner and legitimized China as a trading gateway to the international markets.

15

Speech from Jiang Zemin in Kuala Lumpur on 12 December 1997. Establishment of the 21st Century GoodNeighborly Partnership of Mutual Trust. Full speech from Xinhua at http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/200210/28/content_610547.htm (Accessed 7 April 2015).
16
Or “WTO”

19

Around this time, China began engaging ASEAN with talks of a trade agreement. In
November 2000, ASEAN and Chinese officials agreed to start talks about improving economic
integration and possibly creating a free trade area (Buckley, Hu and Arner, 2011).
Talks were held soon after that November meeting, and in October of 2001, a research
committee commissioned by both ASEAN and China concluded research that concluded that a
free trade agreement would benefit both parties. In 2002, an agreement was signed that would
remove tariffs on about 90% of good effective 2010, improving the fluidity of trade between
ASEAN’s ten members and China. 17
The 2000s also saw China’s growth in global trade as a result of economic reform in the
1990s. As part of their bid to join the WTO, China had cut tariffs from 47.2% in 1990 to 15.8%
in 1999. The result was immediate; by 2000 China had climbed to sixth in the global trade
ranking with trade volumes of $474 billion (Li 2012).
During this time China had aggressively ramped up its export-led strategy. Figure 3
shows the widening current account surplus that began shortly after 2002. With membership in
the WTO coming in 2001, China was able to almost exponentially grow their trade volumes as
their credibility as a trade partner in the global economy increased. GDP also steadily increased
during the early 2000s (Figure 2).
Seeing China’s growth in the world economy, ASEAN business owners had more
incentives to build trading relationships with firms in China. A dramatic free fall in U.S. share of
ASEAN trade accompanied an increase in Chinese share, as business owners began strong
trading rapport with businesses in China (Figure 4). In the period of 2003 to 2013, U.S. share of
ASEAN Total Trade fell by 42.5% while Chinese share increased by 88.7%.
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Looking at individual countries, one can see the dramatic dynamic change in U.S.
presence and Chinese presence in ASEAN in the period 2005 to 2012.
In 2005, most of the ASEAN countries still listed the United States as their biggest trade
partner. Among the six ASEAN countries of Thailand, Cambodia, Indonesia, Philippines,
Vietnam and Malaysia, the U.S. was the number one export destination for all countries except
Indonesia. In Cambodia, exports to the U.S. represented a whopping 53.3% of Cambodian
exports (Table 6).
By 2012, China had eroded away much of the U.S.’s hold on the region. China overtook the U.S.
to become Thailand’s number one export destination with 11.7% share of ASEAN exports.
China also overpassed the U.S. as an export destination in Indonesia and Malaysia, despite not
earning the top spot (Table 7).
These trends are impressive because both China and ASEAN have export-led economies.
By these principles, the United States, as the biggest economy in the world running a very large
current account deficit, should remain a top destination for exports from ASEAN. ASEAN
favoring China as an export destination is a testament to the desire by both parties to foster a
regional economic alliance.
It also shows that the alliance could be self-sustaining; imports from China also increased
in ASEAN between 2005 and 2012, showing that the bilateral trade agreement was almost
cyclical in nature. This makes sense because Southeast Asia is rich with raw materials and
resources that could be exported to China to be turned into manufactured and refined goods and
imported back into ASEAN.
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By 2007, China and ASEAN had reached a finalized agreement that identified tariffs on
7,881 goods that would be lifted under the agreement 18. These agreements had created the
ASEAN-China Free Trade Area. 19 That year, China overtook the United States in share of
ASEAN trade (Figure 4).
Under the agreement, the average tariff rate China charges on ASEAN goods decreased
from 9.8% to 0.1%. The ASEAN states agreed to drop their tariffs from 12.8% to 0.6% (Coates,
2009). Brunei, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Singapore had made the tariff
changes by 2010, while Lao PDR, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Myanmar had until 2015 to make
the changes. 20

3.3 China and ASEAN: Today
As talk of a slowdown in the Chinese economy continues, maintaining and growing a
relationship with ASEAN remains a top priority for the Chinese government. As is, China’s
economic policy for continued growth involves three focuses: domestic growth, international
growth, and regional growth. While China has certainly worked on improving its domestic
economy, the country has also looked outwards to improve its relationship with its neighbors.
For example, China donated a total of 65 billion US dollars into ASEAN programs that support
ASEAN development projects and investment funds (Sutter, 2010). China is also continuing
efforts to take advantage of the large population of ethnic Chinese business owners in Southeast
Asian cities like Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, and Singapore (Stuart-Fox, 2003). As economic
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relationships between China and ASEAN improve, this social link continues to prove useful to
improving the flow of trade.
Optimism is abounding in both China and ASEAN’s camps, and a joint statement
predicts that their bilateral trade will reach 1 trillion dollars by 2020. 21
Part of this optimism comes from anticipated growth from the final four ASEAN
members – Lao PDR, Myanmar, Cambodia, and Vietnam – breaking down their tariffs in 2015.
These four frontier markets, as defined by the MSCI, will be four new markets rife with growth
potential for China to ramp up trade and eventually meet that 1 trillion dollar mark.
Lao PDR and Cambodia boast the highest GDP growth rates in 2013, at 8.5% and 7.4%
respectively (Table 8). Although Myanmar does not report to The World Bank’s database, the
Asian Development Bank predicted that GDP growth in Myanmar was an estimated 6.3% in
2013, which would be the fourth highest GDP growth in ASEAN. 22
Vietnam saw more modest GDP growth in 2013, at 5.4%. But China is by far Vietnam’s
largest import partner, at 25.5% share. Most of these imports are machinery and electronic
products that can be easily shipped from the northeast Vietnamese border with China
(Salidjanova and Koch-Weser, 2015). Expectations for an increased trade relationship with
China come as Vietnam and China opened up the Noi Bai-Lao Cai expressway in September
2014, a road that connects Vietnam’s capital Hanoi with China’s Lao Cai province. 23 The road
is expected to facilitate easier trade, since the expressway shortens travel times between Hanoi
and Lao Cai from between 10 and 12 hours to between three and four hours.
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China also holds the top spot in imports to Myanmar, at a share of 39.9%. As a frontier
market, Myanmar runs a large trade deficit with the world and therefore relies on purchasing
machinery and finished goods from China to sustain its economy. China is Myanmar’s second
largest destination behind Thailand, with most exports to China being natural resources, namely
wood (Salidjanova and Koch-Weser, 2015).
Cambodia has averaged about 8% growth a year, but still remains among the poorer
countries in ASEAN. According to the United Nations Human Development Index, Cambodia
ranked 136th out of 187 countries in terms of economic development (Table 9). While the United
States remains the top destination for Cambodian exports, Cambodia’s number one importer is
China, at a share of 32.6% (Salidjanove and Koch-Weser, 2015).
As one of the poorest countries in ASEAN, Lao PDR has a lot of room for growth, and
tops the list of GDP growth among all the ASEAN countries. Part of their economic potential
comes from their labor market, which is the product of a younger population where over 61% of
people are of working age. China is Lao PDR’s top export destination, at a share of 33.5%, and is
the second largest importer to Lao PDR, at 11.2% as of 2011 (Salidjanove and Koch-Weser,
2015).
ASEAN hopes to use the economic potential of these four countries to draw in its other
trade partners to build larger economic bloc. As is, ASEAN has separate free trade agreements
with Australia, China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand, but wants to merge
the agreements into one Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 24 that would make trade
conditions even more transparent.
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China has taken specific interest in getting the RCEP signed, believing that regional
alliances will prop up ASEAN as a key player in the global economy and, consequently, help all
other countries engaged in the free trade bloc. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said China
wants to get the RCEP signed before the end of 2015 because “the development of ASEAN will
benefit Asian integration.” 25

4. The U.S. Dollar in ASEAN
ASEAN’s impressive trade growth lays a foundation for a discussion on trade settlement
in ASEAN imports and exports, and the role that the renminbi has played in those settlements.
Based on Eichengreen’s findings that trade is the first step to increased global use of a currency,
we can use trends in ASEAN’s trade relationship with China to draw conclusions about how
valuable the renminbi is in the region and whether or not there’s room for the renminbi to grow.
Much like the trade picture, the story of currencies in Southeast Asia begins with the
mighty U.S. dollar, which initially had such a strong footing in ASEAN that some countries had
entirely dollarized economies. After the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the ASEAN nations realized
that a strong dependence on the U.S. dollar subjected the region to Western economic risks.
When ASEAN’s economic priorities shifted to regional cooperation, many countries attempted
to de-dollarize their economies and prop up their domestic currencies.

4.1 Dollarized Economies in ASEAN
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Traveling to Southeast Asia, some American tourists are stunned to see that they can buy
goods with U.S. dollars. In these dollarized economies, so many U.S. dollars are in circulation
that everyday transactions can (and are sometimes preferred) in U.S. dollars over a country’s
domestic currency.
Cambodia is Asia’s most dollarized economy, where nearly 90% of currency in
circulation is US dollars instead of its domestic currency, the Cambodian riel (Hipsher, 2009).
The ratio of riel deposits to GDP sits at around 1%. Comparatively dollarized economies in
Vietnam and Lao PDR have far larger ratios of their domestic currencies to GDP, at 83% and
about 8.5%, respectively (Duma, 2013). Cambodia’s ratio of foreign currency deposits to total
deposits has fluctuated between about 95% to 98% from 2008 to 2012, meaning that the riel is
virtually missing from total deposits. 26
Cambodia’s parallel urban and rural economies describe the flow of two currencies. In
urban sectors like tourism, foreign direct investment, and clothing, the flow of capital comes in
the form of US dollars. For rural agriculture industries, Cambodian riels are used (Duma, 2013).
Over time, Cambodia’s urban sectors have made up the majority of the country’s economy,
meaning that the amount of transactions in US dollars outweighs the use of the Cambodian riel.
Additionally, trade between the United States and Cambodia reflects macroeconomic ties
between the two countries. About 60% of Cambodia’s garments exports head to the United
States, motivating the Cambodians to continue using the US dollar to ease those transactions
(Duma, 2013).
While having a dollarized economy can bring stability to a country’s currency, there are
several risks associated with using another currency alongside one’s own. Much like a currency
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peg, a dollarized economy surrenders control of the country’s monetary policy to the country
owning the foreign currency. 27
Reduced use of the domestic currency also strips the country of the opportunity to earn
seigniorage, or revenue produced when the value of money exceeds the cost of producing
money. Because the US dollar dominates as a payment currency in Cambodia, the National Bank
of Cambodia loses money by printing riels, diverting the flow of revenue to the United States in
doing so (Duma, 2013).
Dollarization in Lao PDR, ASEAN’s poorest country, is far different than the
dollarization experienced in Cambodia. Lao PDR’s main trade partner is its western neighbor
Thailand, meaning that there are a large amount of transactions carried out in Thai baht. The
presence of Thai baht combined with the presence of the US dollar means that the economy in
Lao PDR is dollarized with multiple currencies (Menon, 2007).
There are some benefits to having a dollarized economy with multiple foreign currencies.
Large reserves of foreign currency for multiple countries means that trade can be fluidly
maintained between Lao PDR and both Thailand and the United States, both of which are
important trade partners. But the convenience of conducting transactions with these two
countries is not enough to outweigh the costs of seigniorage and lack of control of monetary
policy (Menon, 2007).

4.2 The U.S. Dollar: Currency Pegs in the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis
All of the ASEAN countries have their own domestic currencies. But looking west, many
of the ASEAN countries instituted currency pegs to stabilize their economies. In doing so, the
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countries assumed unforeseen risks that would later severely harm themselves and others in the
Asian community. Thailand learned this the hard way during the 1997 Asian financial crisis,
when speculators attacked Thai reserves of U.S. dollars and forced the country into letting its
domestic currency float.
The baht began heavily depreciating against the US dollar from 25 baht to one U.S.
dollar to 55 baht to one U.S. dollar in under a year (Lai, 2000). Investors and commercial banks
quickly pulled their assets out of the region, with lenders demanding that their loans be paid
immediately. Thai banks went bankrupt, exports suffered, and in no time, countries like South
Korea, Indonesia, and Japan experienced crippling economic downturns with extremely volatile
market swings. Asian currencies across the board fell against the dollar (Sharma, 2003).
The Thai peg to the US dollar was ironically designed as a stabilizing mechanism for the
emerging Thai market. The Thai baht speculative attack is an episode that illustrates how closely
tied external conditions are to currency dynamics, as explained by Morris Goldstein (1998):
In Thailand and Indonesia, vulnerability was also heightened because banks and/or their
corporate customers - in seeking to minimize their borrowing costs - agreed to shoulder
rollover and currency risk…at the time this was not thought to be such a risky strategy
because the Thai baht and the Indonesia rupiah had been stable with respect to the US
dollar for many years and because the combination of weak economic activity, a huge
stock of bad loans in the banking system, and a public antipathy to bailing out banks
seemed to point to the continuation of low interest rates in Japan. Nevertheless, these
liquidity and currency mismatches eventually took their toll - in moving speculative
attacks, in magnifying the consequences of subsequent exchange rate changes, and in
limiting the authorities’ room for maneuver in crisis management.
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Following the 1997 Asian financial crisis, economies in ASEAN began to depart from U.S.
dollar-dependent monetary policies. But unlike the dramatic fall in U.S. trade with ASEAN, the
1997 crisis did not dismantle the prevalence of the U.S. dollar in ASEAN. As a more convertible
and universal currency, the U.S. dollar was still the preferred currency over the renminbi, which
wasn’t even an option in the 1990s given government restrictions.

4.3 Post-Crisis: De-Dollarizing
Countries, still reeling from the crisis, began propping up their domestic currencies as
trade volume growth resumed. For dollarized economies like those in Cambodia, Lao PDR and
Vietnam, detaching their reliance on the U.S. dollar proved to be a difficult task.
One reason why economies have a tough time propping up its domestic currency is
timing. Prolonged dollarization tends to deepen dependence on foreign currency denominated
assets even during macroeconomic stability (Duma, 2013). Additionally, dollarized economies
reduce the capability of the domestic government to implement effective monetary policy.
Dollarization allows governments to base their monetary policy around the dynamics of another
country’s currency; when de-dollarization is attempted, many of these governments find that
they’re incapable of properly managing their domestic currency.
Lao PDR tried to implement their own economic reform aimed at de-dollarizing their
economy. As of 2011, Lao PDR has an economy that is just under 50% dollarized, down from
80% in 2000. Most of the country’s foreign money is Thai baht, although the US dollar is still
used significantly (Duma, 2013).
In 1997, the government declared that only the domestically minted Lao kip could be
used as a medium exchange in domestic transactions. The government hoped to standardize a
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local currency and appreciate it against the Thai baht and the US dollar, both heavily used
foreign currencies in Laos. But by forcing traders to accept the more volatile kip, the Lao people
lost further confidence in the weak currency, depreciating the kip against the baht and dollar
(Menon, 2007). The decrease in value had actually reduced the Lao kip’s share in the country’s
money supply from about 50% to about 30% (Duma). This is one example of how forcing dedollarization can have adverse effects.
Vietnam managed to implement its own de-dollarization reform relatively successfully,
although their economy wasn’t nearly as dollarized as Cambodia or Lao PDR. The country
maintained a heavily monitored floating exchange rate to handle foreseeable inflation. Smart
control of the exchange rate convinced Vietnam’s citizens and foreign investors that Vietnam’s
macroeconomic outlook was positive and that their currency, the Vietnam dong, could be trusted
as a store of value. The government’s commitment to solidifying the dong as a broad money also
involved implementing strict rules about foreign currency deposits, further proving to the
Vietnamese people that the economy could rely on its own domestic currency (Alvarez-Plata and
García-Herrero, 2007).

5. The Renminbi in ASEAN
As Duma (2013) pointed out, inertia exists when countries heavily use the U.S. dollar. As
a currency is established as a dominant vehicle for settlement in a country, a government, firm,
or any agent using the currency has little incentive to settle trade in another currency.
With several frontier market ASEAN countries making moves to de-dollarize their
economies, there’s good reason to believe the dominance of the U.S. dollar is eroding and that
the inertia of use of the dollar is slowing down.
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The question now remains: will the renminbi now replace the U.S. dollar? In order to
address this question it is necessary to look at the basics of currencies as a trade settlement.
When a country trades with another country, there are three options for settling the
transaction. It can settle in its own domestic currency, in the currency of the country they’re
trading with, or in the currency of a third party country. There is no formula as to which method
is the best; settling in one method over the other comes with different transaction costs and
benefits that can vary depending on what goods are being traded and in what macroeconomic
conditions.
Renminbi liberalization is fairly recent, but ASEAN has shown interest in increasing their
renminbi reserves as China continues to grow in trade with the region.

5.1 Incentives for a Strong Renminbi in ASEAN
Even with the dominant U.S. dollar, trade was and has always been strong between
ASEAN and China. But an internationalized renminbi provides incentives to both China and
ASEAN. For existing trade relationships, readily accessible renminbi in trade settlement lowers
transaction costs for foreign companies operating in or buying from China. Additionally, wider
access to renminbi opens up more businesses to cross border trade, as the barriers to currency
exchange are broken down.
From an investing standpoint, renminbi availability provides a variety of hedging options
as international trade increases. It also reduces foreign exchange hedging costs for foreign direct
investment. 28
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For China, an internationalized and more readily utilized renminbi means less exposure
to the U.S. dollar in its own reserves. China currently is the largest holder of foreign exchange
reserves, most of which are in U.S. dollars. In order to move towards a more independent
economy, China would want a more international renminbi to warrant the decrease in U.S. dollar
reserves held (“RMB Roadmap” 6). 29

5.2 Renminbi Liberalization and The Trade Settlement Scheme
China began its campaign to liberalizing its renminbi in Southeast Asia.
The first step towards internationalization was dropping the peg against the dollar. In
2005, the Chinese government unpegged the renminbi from the dollar in favor of a closely
managed float. The peg was reinstituted between 2008 and 2010 to stabilize China’s economy
during the global recession, but has since returned to a managed float based on a basket of
currencies.
For the longest time, the renminbi was restricted from use in settlement of cross-border
trade. With a flourishing trade relationship, China introduced a pilot program in June 2009 that
would allow the use of the renminbi in settlement of trade between five select Chinese cities and
three regions: Hong Kong, Macau, and ASEAN (Eichengreen and Kawai, 2014).
China has instituted a two option system for processing a transaction settled in renminbi,
as represented in figure 5, which uses Hong Kong as an example, although the same general
concept is employed in ASEAN. In the first option, a business doing trade with China would
have to move funds through a designated offshore clearing bank. The bank then channels the
funds to a domestic settlement bank in China, who then transfers the renminbi into the Chinese
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company’s account. The process works vice versa for a Chinese company conducting trade with
a foreign company.
The second option involves an agency agreement in which an overseas participating bank
opens an on-shore inter-bank renminbi account with a domestic agent bank in China. Through a
binding agreement, the domestic agent bank would process the cross-border transaction and
report details of the transaction to the People’s Bank of China, since the transaction did not pass
through an official domestic settlement bank as in the first option.
In both options, offshore banks obviously need to be readily supplied with renminbi in
order to process transactions settled in renminbi. Through bilateral currency swap agreements,
the People’s Bank of China swaps currencies at an agreed rate with the monetary authority of the
target offshore country. The monetary authority then supplies their offshore clearing banks and
overseas participating banks with renminbi. In the example with Hong Kong, the Hong Kong
Monetary Authority would swap currencies with the People’s Bank of China to get renminbi and
supply offshore clearing banks like the Bank of China Hong Kong and overseas participating
banks like Standard Chartered.
The system is tightly run, and overseas participating banks, onshore settlement banks,
and domestic agent banks must earn the approval of both offshore monetary authorities and the
People’s Bank of China in order to earn eligibility in the scheme. Regardless, many banks have
been deemed eligible since the start of the scheme. In Hong Kong, 208 banks were participating
in the scheme as of March 2013, covering an estimated 1,500 renminbi accounts (Rhee and
Sumulong, 2014).

33

5.3 Clearing Banks and Trade Settlements in ASEAN
ASEAN has not widely adopted the scheme, partially because the scheme is so new. In
2011, ASEAN and China agreed to amend the ACFTA to allow third party settling so that trade
in other currencies could come through clearing centers like Hong Kong. 30 But the first offshore
renminbi clearing bank in Singapore didn’t open until May 2013. The Singapore branch of the
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 31 became the first renminbi clearing bank outside of
Hong Kong and Taiwan.
Thailand was the next ASEAN country to set up a domestic renminbi clearing bank. In
January 2015, the Bangkok branch of the ICBC earned clearing bank status. 32 Malaysia followed
soon after in April 2015 and signed a minimum credit line of US$20 billion to clear renminbi
through the Bank of China Malaysia. 33
Because of the lack of financial infrastructure in the frontier and developing markets of
ASEAN, Singapore largely acts as the intermediary between the ASEAN traders and China. The
entire region of ASEAN began pushing transactions through Singapore, allowing it to overtake
London as the number one offshore renminbi payments center after Hong Kong. 34
As of 2014, 20% of China’s foreign trade is settled in renminbi, which is a dramatic
change from 3% in 2010. Comparatively speaking, this is far smaller than the 50-60% of the
eurozone’s external trade that’s settled in euro and 30-40% in yen for Japanese trade (Flint,
2014). The ASEAN countries’ share of trade with China settled in renminbi is smaller - the
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Ministry of Trade and Industry Singapore. (2011). ‘Overview of ASEAN-China (ACFTA).’
http://www.fta.gov.sg/fta_acfta.asp?hl=2. (Accessed 5 April 2015).
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Industrial and Commercial Bank of China. ‘ICBC Designated as RMB Clearing Bank in Bangkok.’ ICBC News.
http://goo.gl/RnnaCx (Accessed 5 April 2015).
33
The Malaysia Insider. ‘Bank of China mulls providing credit line to local derivatives exchange.’
http://goo.gl/yfK2NO (Accessed 14 April 2015).
34
ASIFMA. (2014). RMB Roadmap: May 2014. Asia Securities Industry & Financial Markets Association, 50.
http://www.asifma.org/uploadedfiles/resources/rmb%20roadmap.pdf (Accessed 14 April 2015).
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region averages 10-12%. Between Malaysia and China, only 1.3% of trade is conducted in
renminbi. 35
Indonesia, who is actively promoting renminbi settling in the face of rupiah depreciation,
settles just fewer than 10% of its trade in renminbi. About 90% of its trade is still settled in U.S.
dollars (“ICBC Indonesia to promote wider use of renminbi”). 36
Other measurements put ASEAN use of the renminbi closer to its global average of 20%.
Figure 6 says transactions in renminbi made up 11.5% of Chinese trade in 2012 and 18.2% of
Chinese trade in 2013. It should be noted, however, that these numbers also account for Hong
Kong, meaning that any transactions that were settled through Hong Kong’s clearing banks
would have been accounted for.

5.4 Bilateral Swap Agreements and Renminbi Deposits
Because the ASEAN infrastructure for use of the renminbi as a trade settlement currency
is so young, we can look at other indicators to project future growth of the renminbi in trade. One
way is by looking at renminbi deposits. Because China’s trade settlement scheme involves the
supply of renminbi to offshore clearing banks and overseas participating banks, renminbi
deposits in a given country are a good way to tell if the country is readily welcoming the
circulation of renminbi in its economy.
Bilateral swap agreements allow the Bank of China and banks in the ASEAN countries to
inject offshore financial institutions with renminbi. These agreements require individual
countries to take the initiative to sign their own bilateral agreements with China. As of August
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2014, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and Thailand had signed currency swap agreement with
the People’s Bank of China, with Singapore getting the largest credit line of 300 billion renminbi
(Table 10).
These supplies are important because even though Indonesia does not have a clearing
bank of its own, building up renminbi shows interest in getting a clearing bank in the future.
The best indicator of growth in renminbi settlement is Singapore, who as the hub of
ASEAN has had to dramatically increase its renminbi deposits to handle the growing number of
transactions. Between June 2013 and December 2014, renminbi deposits in Singapore doubled
from 138 billion to 277 billion (Table 11).

6. Conclusion
The renminbi as a currency for trade settlement in ASEAN is a fascinating case study
into how much economic weight China really holds in the world. Although the trade statistics
show that China is arguably the most important trade partner with ASEAN today, the renminbi
indicates that the financial infrastructure in ASEAN is still adjusting to the idea of using China’s
currency in trade.
It would be too rash, given the relatively recent – and continuing – liberalization of the
renminbi, to argue that the renminbi is on its way to becoming the most used currency in
payment in ASEAN. Conversely, it would be too rash to argue that the renminbi is irrelevant in
the region.
It’s far more productive to look at what is being done to further internationalize the
currency to project the trajectory of the currency in future trade.
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6.1 The Future of the Renminbi in Trade
The trade settlement scheme employed by Hong Kong and some cities in ASEAN have
worked relatively well, but the frontier and emerging markets in Southeast Asia present unique
opportunities for renminbi financing.
Discussions are underway for the creation of a Regional Settlement Intermediary 37 which
would allow cross-border bond transactions in addition to a regional trade payment settlement
system. Because of the growing number of local currency bonds cross-border debt securities in
Asia, it could make sense to create a model that would allow countries to enter bilateral
agreements that would also include debt securities. Through this strategy, banks would be able to
provide even more convertibility options for the renminbi (Rhee and Sumulong, 2014).
China is also moving fast to push use of the renminbi through more currency swap
agreements. In 2011, China and ASEAN discussed the possibility of a regional bilateral currency
swap agreement, which would effectively stabilize the renminbi in export and import trade and
increase use of the renminbi (Ririhena and Fadillah, 2011).
China is also focused on opening up free trade zones to improve its credibility as a global
currency. The country has opened up Shanghai as a free trade zone, where significant restrictions
and regulations on foreign investment are eased (Sudworth, 2013). Hoping to become a reformed
hub of international trade, Shanghai aspires to one day become a first-tier international financial
center like London or New York, which is a necessary step if the renminbi wants to become an
international vehicle currency.

37

Or “RSI”
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6.2 Expectations for the Renminbi
Despite all of these measures, the renminbi has a long way to go before it can compare to
the Euro and the US dollar, especially when the US dollar still commands 62.2% of foreign
exchange reserves in the world and 57.6% in Asia. 38
Part of the challenge comes from the need to de-dollarize the ASEAN economies, namely
the poorer frontier countries of Lao PDR, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Myanmar. Other challenges
come from a need for China to liberalize the availability of its currency and open up more
avenues for trade partners to settle trade in renminbi, which China has only recently started to do.
By all standards, China is also itself still a developing nation and has not fully opened up
its economy. The country still has strong restrictions on foreign investment and heavy
regulations on several industries. The communist country also has control over the finance sector
and does not allow a market-dependent interest rate. If the country wants its renminbi to compare
to the likes of the Euro and the US dollar, the currency must become more liquid and convertible
in a liberalized and open market.
China’s politics have also soured ASEAN relations at times, although the trade data does
not reflect so. Continuing arguments over ownership of islands in the South China Sea have
brought heated debate to some ASEAN Summit meetings. Vietnam has specifically confronted
China over the presence of an oil rig near their coast, but failed to rally the other ASEAN
countries to speak out against China.
As of late, ASEAN’s strategy towards the South China Sea dispute has been to ignore the
issue entirely. No releases or statements were ever published that formalized ASEAN’s stances
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on China’s presence in the South China Sea, which more or less enables China to continue any
existing operations being conducted in the area (Tiezzi, 2014).
The fear therefore exists that China will leverage its size and economic magnitude to
bully ASEAN, although relations for the time being are mutual. Part of this fear comes from the
fact that ASEAN didn’t really become more independent when it gradually reduced its
dependence on the U.S. after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. If anything, ASEAN merely
displaced its dependence on the U.S. to a dependence on China.
On the other hand, China’s relationship with ASEAN has brought incredible economic
growth to Southeast Asia. The focus on regional cooperation and financial integration is also
proving to be a stable foreign policy for ASEAN and other East Asian countries.
As the economic focal point of Asia, or even the world, China and its renminbi are the
crystal ball to ASEAN’s future. By Eichengreen (2012)’s standards of an internationalized
currency, trade between China and ASEAN is key to making the renminbi a more utilized
currency and thus to eventually becoming a more prominent currency in loans, bonds, and
currency reserves in Southeast Asia. Conversely, a stronger renminbi can make trade even more
fluid and bring in more capital to Southeast Asia’s lucrative frontier markets.
I believe that we are witnessing a China that is in the process of achieving this. An open
Shanghai is the first step in breaking down some of these restrictions and regulations, and
allowing free trade to improve the flow of investment in and out of China. This will
consequently bring immediate trade changes to China-ASEAN relations, as the Southeast Asian
regions are geographically close to China. If the renminbi can become more internationalized in
the future, ASEAN will see much of the currency’s surge in use given their close trade
relationships.
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Unlike Japan, which experienced growth in the 1970s but eventually fell to limited
resources and labor, China is an enriched nation with many resources and a large population to
facilitate continued growth. The United States, which has enjoyed strong relationships with
ASEAN, will slowly see China chip away at its influence as the Asian economies become more
integrated. This integration, in my opinion, is inevitable as historic data has shown.
In 2012, the renminbi was the 20th most used world payment at a share of 0.25% of total
world payments. That was behind the Turkish Lira, Mexican Peso, and New Zealand Dollar. 39
Just three years later, the renminbi jumped up to the 7th most used world payment, at 1.81%
share of total world payment, a six-fold increase compared to 2012. 40 The six currencies that
have a larger share than the renminbi are the Canadian dollar, Swiss Franc, Japanese Yen, British
Pound, Euro, and U.S. Dollar. These are all reserve currencies that have earned great respect in
international trade. In many respects, the Chinese renminbi is already in the highest echelon of
currencies in the world.
By this standard, its only a matter of time before China and its renminbi join the likes of
the Japanese yen, British pound sterling and Euro as widely used currencies around the world. If
China commits itself to opening its economy and continuing healthy trade with ASEAN, the
renminbi could become a more widely used currency in trade settlement and consequently in the
world economy.
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Appendix
The following chart shows total ASEAN trade, with the portion of U.S. and China trade
highlighted accordingly. The U.S. held a steady share of ASEAN trade until the early 2000s.
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Other

Figure 1: ASEAN Total Trade by Country, 1990-1999
Between 1990 and 1996, all the ASEAN countries saw substantial total trade increase. Some
countries saw a doubling or almost tripling of trade during this period, as export-led economies
continued to churn out products to the United States and other destinations around the world.
Between 1996 and 1997, trade numbers started to stall as concerns amounted over the financial
stability of ASEAN and other East Asian countries. The 1997 Asian financial crisis saw the
dramatic drop in trade in 1997 and 1998.
Data for Philippines was not available prior to 1996. Data for Brunei was sporadically reported
during this period.
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Figure 2: China GDP and Total Trade, 1980-2013
Since 1980, China has impressively increased its role as a trade partner in the global economy.
Chinese trade gradually increased between 1984 and 2000, but China’s accession into the WTO
in 2001 began a period of soaring growth in trade. In the period between 2001 and 2007, Chinese
GDP also rose dramatically as the country began overtaking other world powers in economic
size. Today, China is the world’s second largest economy.
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Figure 3: China Exports and Imports, 1984-2013
While exports and imports were generally balanced between 1984 and 2003, China started to
pursue an export-led strategy after joining the WTO and increasing its manufacturing capacity.
As a result, China began to increase its trade surplus. The sharp drop in 2008 reflects the global
financial crisis, which China had bounced back from by 2010.
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Figure 4: Share of ASEAN Total Trade, 1990 to 2013
Prior to 2006, the United States maintained a strong foothold as a trade partner in ASEAN. The
peak of this relationship was in 1997, when the Asian financial crisis struck. Following the crisis,
skepticism of U.S. involvement in ASEAN and a more powerful China encouraged ASEAN to
form a mutual economic relationship with China. China surpassed the United States in share of
total trade with ASEAN in 2006, and has distanced its gap in share with the U.S. since then.
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Figure 5: The PRC-Hong Kong, China Renminbi Settlement Scheme
In Hong Kong, China employs a scheme in which there are two options to settle a transaction in
renminbi. The first option involves using an offshore clearing bank, certified by the People’s
Bank of China, to process the transaction to a domestic settlement bank in China’s mainland.
The domestic settlement bank then deposits or withdraws renminbi from the Chinese company’s
account.
In a second option, an overseas participating bank, also certified by the People’s Bank of China,
signs an agency agreement with a domestic agent bank that sets up a renminbi account for the
specific purposes of cross-border transactions. That bank then deposits or withdraws renminbi
from the account in the mainland.
In both cases, the People’s Bank of China supplies a monetary authority agency (like the Hong
Kong Monetary Authority) with renminbi to pass along to offshore clearing banks or overseas
participating banks. This supply of renminbi is established through a swap agreement.
The PRC-Hong Kong, China Renminbi Settlement Scheme

SOURCE: Rhee, C., Sumulong, L. (2014). Regional Settlement Infrastructure and Currency Internationalization:
The Case of Asia and the Renminbi. ADBI Institute.
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Figure 6: Use of the renminbi by trade corridor with China/Hong Kong
SWIFT’s analysis of the use of renminbi shows that in 2012, ASEAN used the renminbi in trade
more than any other trade corridor in the world. In 2013, the Middle East and North Africa
leapfrogged ASEAN as a user of the renminbi.
Use of the renminbi by trade corridor with China/Hong Kong

SOURCE: SWIFT (2014). RMB Roadmap: May 2014. Asia Securities Industry & Financial Markets Association.
Compiled using MT103 transactions
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Table 1: The Roles of International Money
Money has three functions: store of value, medium of exchange, and unit of account. Cohen
(1971) organized a taxonomy to illustrate how each function translates into different
international uses by government and private agents. Kenen (1983) also notes this taxonomy in
his paper describing how the U.S. dollar has managed to become the undisputed king of
international currencies.
Function

Use by
governments

Use by private agents

Store of value

International
Reserves

Foreign currencies become substitutes for a
domestic currency because the latter is prone to
inflation and volatility. In the extreme, foreign
currencies can even become legal tender

Medium of
Exchange
Unit of
Account

Vehicle for
foreign exchange
intervention
Anchor for
pegging local
currency

Settling trade and financial transactions
Denominating/invoicing trade and financial
transactions
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Table 2: Discrepancies in Reported Volume of ASEAN-China Trade
Data for total ASEAN-China trade was pulled from three databases to illustrate discrepancies in
reporting: United Nations’ Comtrade Database, ASEANstats database, and the China Statistical
Yearbook. The differences can be large, as noted by the 2012 numbers in which the China
Statistical Yearbook reported $80 billion more in trade than ASEANstats. To avoid biases
towards either ASEAN or China in this statistical analysis, I’ve decided to use the UN Comtrade
Database.
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Table 3. GDP Growth Rates in ASEAN, 1991-1996
The period 1991 to 1996 marked the peak of economic growth up until the 1997 Asian Financial
Crisis. During this period, the ASEAN countries saw average GDP growth rates as high as 7.59
in 1994, as an export-led strategy continued to keep ASEAN afloat in the global economy.

(Percentages)
Country
Brunei Darussalam
Indonesia
Laos
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Vietnam

1991
4
8.9
n.a.
8.6
n.a.
0
7.3
8.5
n.a.

1992
-1.1
7.2
7
7.8
n.a.
0.3
6.2
8.1
8.6

1993
0.5
7.3
5.9
8.3
n.a.
2.1
10.4
8.3
8.8

1994
1.8
7.5
8.1
9.2
9.2
4.4
10.5
8.8
8.8

1995
2
8.1
7
9.5
6.9
4.8
8.8
8.6
9.5

1996
3.5
7.8
7
8.6
5.8
5.7
7
6.6
9.4

Average:

6.22

5.51

6.45

7.59

7.24

6.82

SOURCE: ASEAN Macroeconomic Outlook, 1997-1998 (Jakarta: ASEAN Academic Press, ASEAN
Secretariat, 1998).
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Table 4. Current Account Deficit in ASEAN, 1991-1996
Looking at the five of the more advanced economies in ASEAN, there’s a noticeable current
account deficit that was maintained through the early 1990s. Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines
and Thailand were actually running on swelling current account deficits leading up to the 1997
Asian financial crisis. This means that creditors were continuing to make investments in the
region, expecting production and exports to grow even more in the near future.

Current Account Deficit as a Percentage of GDP, 1991-96
Country
Indonesia
Malaysia
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand

1991
-3.4
-8.8
-1.9
11.2
-7

1992
-2.2
-3.8
-1.6
11.3
-5.7

1993
-1.5
-4.8
-5.5
7.5
-5.1

1994
-1.7
-7.8
-4.6
17.1
-5.6

1995
-3.4
-10
-4.4
16.9
-8.1

SOURCE: ASEAN Macroeconomic Outlook, 1997-1998 (Jakarta: ASEAN Academic Press, ASEAN
Secretariat, 1998).
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1996
-3.4
-4.9
-4.5
15
-7.9

Table 5: Chinese Average GDP Growth, 1980s to 1990s
Following Deng Xiaoping’s rise to power as President of China, a series of economic and social
reform sought to reorganize and industrialize the Chinese economy. During this period, average
GDP growth soared as China began pursuing an export-led strategy with its newfound
manufacturing capacity.

SOURCE: The World Bank
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Table 6: Share of Trade in ASEAN, 2005
In the six ASEAN countries of Thailand, Cambodia, Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam and
Malaysia, the United States remained a key trade partner in 2005. Although China had taken
over as a major importer to ASEAN, the United States was a larger export destination for all six
countries. In Cambodia, the U.S.’s share was 50% larger than China’s share of exports, at a
negligible 0.3%. In Thailand, Cambodia, Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia, the United States
also earned the title as the number 1 export destination.
These figures exclude the Hong Kong and Macao strategic administrative regions in calculation
for “China.” Data from Myanmar and Lao PDR were unavailable.
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Table 7: Share of ASEAN Trade in ASEAN, 2012
By 2012, China has grown to become a far larger trade partner in ASEAN. China had increased
its lead as an importer to ASEAN, becoming the top importer in Cambodia, Indonesia, Vietnam
and Malaysia. In exports, China has overtaken the United States as a destination for exports in
Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia, which is significant given just how small of a share China had
in 2005 compared to the United States. While the United States managed to maintain a larger
share in Cambodia, Philippines and Vietnam, its share shrunk considerably as China continued to
liberalize trade barriers between itself and ASEAN.
These figures exclude the Hong Kong and Macao strategic administrative regions in calculation
for “China.” Data from Myanmar and Lao PDR were unavailable.
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Table 8: GDP Growth in % for ASEAN Countries, 2005-2013
Between the ten ASEAN countries, GDP growth remained steady between 2005 and 2013,
spurred on by a growing trade relationship with China. Higher GDP growth is coming from the
developing and frontier markets of Vietnam, Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar.
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Table 9: Human Development Index Ranking, 2013
The United Nations measures “human development indicators” that cross-examine life
expectancy, education attainment (measured by expected and mean years of schooling), and
income. The UN conducts this analysis across 187 countries. Out of the ten countries in ASEAN,
the highest ranked country was the developed and advanced Singapore, at number 9 in the world.
The lowest was Myanmar, at 150.
Human Development Index Ranking, from UN Development Programme, 2013
Country
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
Indonesia
Lao People's Democratic Republic
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Viet Nam

Rank (Out of 187 Countries)
30
136
108
139
62
150
117
9
89
121
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Table 10: China’s Currency Swap Agreements
As of August 2014, the People’s Bank of China has four currency swap agreements with
Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand in the total value of $650 billion renminbi. This is
providing a supply of renminbi to banks in these countries, signaling an increase in interest in
using the renminbi as a trade settlement currency. Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand all have
clearing banks that have been authorized to handle renminbi. Indonesia is showing interest in
getting its own clearing center.

SOURCE: Destais, C. (2014). Central Bank Currency Swaps and the International Monetary System. CEPII.
http://www.cepii.fr/PDF_PUB/pb/2014/pb2014-05.pdf (Accessed 15 April 2015).
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Table 11: RMB Deposits in Singapore
Singapore has significantly ramped up its holdings of renminbi in the 18-month period between
June 2013 and December 2014. By doubling its renminbi deposits, Singapore is seeing an
increase in use of the renminbi in transactions. As the hub of Southeast Asia, an increase in
renminbi deposits in Singapore could signal an increase in overall ASEAN interest in using the
currency, since many ASEAN business will process transactions and trade through the port of
Singapore.

SOURCE: Monetary Authority of Singapore
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